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Abstract 
The effectiveness of foreign aid on economic growth is a much debated topic on the field of Development 
Economics. As such, a huge body of literature is available with the vast majority concluding that aid contributes 
in increasing growth (Hansen and Tarp, 2000); although some scholars, amongst them Boone (1996), Ovaka 
(2003), and Moyo (2009) hold a different and an opposite view. Aware of the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
poorest region in the world (Chen and Ravallion, 2012), (World Bank, 2012), and that Sub-Saharan Africa is the 
region which is the biggest beneficiary of aid (Lancaster, 1999), (OECD, 2010); but nevertheless aid in this 
region seems not to produce the expected results. There is a high volume of literature on the impact of foreign 
aid on development in Africa, yet not many of them recognize all the factors that contribute to aid (in) 
effectiveness. The focus is often on macro-economic indicators which do not fairly represent the realities of 
poverty and suffering in many African countries. We offer an analysis of the theories that have been propounded 
to explain the relationship between aid and (under) development in Africa. In this paper, we critically examine 
such findings  
Keywords: Corruption; Foreign aid, Economic growth, Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
1. Introduction 
Economic theories have identified capital formation as the basic problem of most developing countries, most 
especially Africa and aid is adjudged to play a vital role in capital formation which is essential for economic 
growth. The objective of foreign aid has been to end extreme world poverty, increase savings and investment and 
enhance living standard in developing countries, which is exactly what Africa needs. In consonance to the theory 
side, Africa has been the largest recipient of foreign aid. According to OECD Report (2009b), total net Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from members of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) rose by 10.2 per 
cent in real terms to US$110.8 billion in 2008; it rose to US$130 billion in 2010. Likewise, bilateral aid 
(excluding volatile debt relief grant) to Africa and Sub Saharan Africa rose by 10.6 per cent and 10 per cent 
respectively in real terms. The need for large aid inflow into Africa is necessary to accentuate the consistent 
dwindling living standard in Africa. For instance, studies have shown that during the 80s, averagely, Sub 
Saharan Africa per capita income fell at an annual rate of 2.2 percent while per capita consumption dropped by 
14.8 per cent and import volume rose at an annual rate of 4.3 per cent with export volume remaining constant; 
likewise, the real GDP per capita growth rate falls continually and became negative in the early 90s. In the same 
manner, about 79 per cent and 80 per cent of SSA countries were identified as low human development countries 
and heavily indebted countries respectively (Bakare, 2011). From the foregoing, it therefore becomes imperative 
that to escape the strap of economic slump, Africa countries needs to be helped (Riddle 2007).  
As a home to a large proportion of the world’s “bottom billion”, Sub Saharan Africa has attracted 
substantial amount of foreign aid over the years. Statistics shows that ODA flow to the region stood at $80 
billion in 2008, it reached $125 billion in 2010 and may likely rise in later years. Over the last five decades, 
foreign aid to governments in SSA amounts to over $1 trillion. In spite of this vast volume of aid inflow, it is 
worrisome to note that Africa, mostly SSA countries are yet to experience any significant economic progress.  
Instead the countries have been continually plagued with high levels of unemployment, absolute 
poverty, low GDP per capita level, high mortality rates, low level of education and lack of access to health care 
facilities (Mosley, Hudson and Horrell 1987). The experience of Africa was unlike the story of other countries, 
for instance, China whose total ODA as a percentage of the world’s total ODA was not as high as that of SSA 
experienced a higher growth leading to more structural change. As ODA increased from 0.2 percent in 1980 to 3 
percent in 1985, economic growth rate increased from approximately 6 percent to 12 percent in the same period 
implying that as ODA doubled its rate, the economic growth rate also reciprocated suggesting that foreign aid 
was effective in accomplishing growth.  
The situation seems contrary in SSA, when ODA reduced to 28 percent (as percent of world) economic 
growth rate became positive from its declining state and grew to 1.1 per cent. As the ODA pumped to Sub-
Saharan Africa countries increased, economic growth rate declined, this therefore implies that aid has not been 
very effective in SSA countries. At the same time period, growth of GDP per capita in Africa actually registered 
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a marked decline and was for many years even negative. GDP per capita figures also declined across most of 
Sub- Saharan Africa asides a few countries. For example, World Bank calculations show that based on the 
predictions of theories, foreign aid transfers to Zambia, which began in the 1960s, would have by today pushed 
per-capita income to over $20,000. However, reverse is the case as Zambian income per capita has stagnated at 
around $600 for years (Farah 2009). This provides a vivid illustration of the failures of foreign aid in Sub 
Saharan Africa.  
There have been different debates and opinions about the effect of foreign aid on economic 
performance. One strand of literature states that there exists a positive relation between foreign aid and economic 
growth (Gupta 1975; Stoneman 1975; Gulati 1978; McGowan and Smith 1978; Bradshaw 1985) while another 
strand is based on the premise of an inverse relation between foreign aid and growth (Okon 2012; Brautigam and 
Knack 2004). Yet another strand states that there is no relationship whatsoever between foreign aid and 
economic growth (Mosley 1980; Svensson 1999, 2000; Knack 2001; Brumn 2003; Ovaska 2003; Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman 2004; Djankou, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2006). Thus, there has actually been no 
straightforward answer to the question of aid effectiveness. The evidences from literature has erstwhile been 
unparalleled until recently when empirical evidences identified that the quality of institutions in different 
economies mighty have played a significant role in the mixed results obtained hitherto. According to Whitaker 
(2006); Abuzeid (2009) and Durbarry, Gemmell and Greenaway (1998); Burnside and Dollar (2000), the quality 
of institutions is crucial in aid performance; this therefore implies that aid becomes more effective in high quality 
public institutions.  
Consequently, Moyo (2009) challenged the theoretical strand surrounding the effectiveness of aid and 
opines that the billions of dollars in aid sent from wealthy countries to developing Africa nations has not helped 
to reduce poverty and increase growth. In fact, poverty levels continue to escalate and growth rates have steadily 
declined and millions continue to suffer. Similarly, overreliance on aid has trapped developing nations in a 
vicious circle of aid dependency, corruption, market distortion, and further poverty, leaving them with nothing 
but the need for aid. Our study is a corollary to the work of Moyo (2009)1 but differs with our inclusion of 
control for institutional quality; though consistent to Burnside and Dollar (1997), our re-examination focused on 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Furthermore, our key interest in this re-examination is to ascertain whether aid has 
any effect on developing Africa’s growth and poverty level. Though, this issue has been addressed from different 
perspective, we intend to examine the aid-growth nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for the role of 
institutions, education 2 
 
2. Review of Relevant Literature  
According to Whitaker (2006), there is a positive relationship between aid and economic growth especially in 
countries that have sound policies that facilitates trade and the economy at large. This is also supported by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), Farah (2009) and Durbarry et al., (1998) which suggests foreign aid also leads to 
economic growth if good fiscal policies and strong institutions are in place. The kinds of policies here 
encompass ensuring small, if any, budget deficits, controlling inflation, as well as trade openness and 
globalization; similarly, Durbarry et al., (1998) found that geographical factor is also a determinant of aid 
effectiveness. Mosley et al., (1987) sees foreign aid as being a channel of supplying international capital; as it 
serves as a big push to the post World War reconstruction of Europe under the U.S Marshall Plan while Farah 
(2009) opined that the big push theory can only work where there are reformed institutions and policies.  
According to Burnside and Dollar (2000), World Bank (1998), aid is much more effective in 
environments characterized by high institutions quality as part of a capable developmental state. Todd Moss et 
al., (2010) suggest that “institutional development is an independent variable which affects the productivity of 
aid and is a recognized factor used to select and allocate to aid recipients”. Whitaker (2006) also showed that 
despite the massive amounts of foreign aid forwarded by developed nations and international institutions, the 
perceived lack of result from this raises the question as to the actual effectiveness of foreign aid in developing 
Africa economies. The result of his study was that foreign aid had a positive effect on growth but factors like 
conflict and geography lessens the impact and can even make it negative. It was suggested by the World Bank 
that increasing foreign aid flows by $10 billion would lift about 25 million people out of poverty per year, 
provided that such countries have sound economic management. The figure drops to 7 million people for 
countries when it is vice versa.  
Another strand of literature disagrees and is of the opinion that foreign aid has a negative effect on 
                                                          
1 Moyo disregarded the role of the state by emphasizing private sector and free enterprise. She argued that aid deepen the 
level of corruption and conflict, inhibits social capital and foreign investment. Though, this claim seem unconvincing, as aid 
is an assistance development fund that can only thrive healthily on an established macroeconomic, infrastructural and 
institutional arrangement.  
2 This form the bedrock for macroeconomic environment  
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economic growth because it encourages corruption, encourages rent seeking behaviors and erodes bureaucratic 
institutions. Ali and Isse (2005) also showed that aid is bound by decreasing marginal returns thus explaining 
another way in which development assistance can be unfavourable to economic growth. Likewise, Boone (1995) 
discovered that in the 1970s and 1980s, aid intensive African countries experienced no economic growth though 
foreign aid as measured by share of GDP was actually increasing. Similarly, Knack (2001) espoused that 
increasing Foreign aid erodes bureaucratic and institutional quality as well as increases the level of corruption 
and encourages rent seeking behaviour. Also, Bauer (1971) and Friedman (1958) hinged aid inefficiency on the 
fact that politicians do not allocate aid properly as measured against the set goals and targets. Recipient countries 
misuse capital inflows since lack of domestic savings show lack of opportunities. The literature has also claimed 
that there exists a negative casual relationship between aid and growth in low developing countries because aid 
hinders growth by substituting for savings and investment rather than acting as their supplements.  
According to Djankov et al., (2005), foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries 
and may result into rent-seeking behavior. It was also discovered that foreign aid had a negative effect on 
democracy. The effect of oil rents on political institutions was also measured and aid was seen as a bigger curse 
than oil. Consequently, the literature witnessed a renewed interest in explaining how foreign aid influences the 
cross country economic growth. Jones and Williams (2000) argue that differences between countries in capital 
accumulation, productivity, and output per worker can ultimately be attributed to differences in “social 
infrastructure,” which they define as the institutions and government policies that determine the economic 
environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output. 
Boone (1995) concluded that aid does not significantly increase investment and growth but it increases the size 
of government. Fiscal analyst and donors are of the opinion that aid process is weakened by the ability of the 
recipient governments to alter their spending patterns to undermine the sectoral distribution of expenditure for 
designated projects (Conchesta, 2008).  
A few studies (Heller, 1975; Khilji and Zampelli, 1991; Pack and Pack, 1993) have supported the 
theoretical proposition that developing countries have been rendering foreign aid fungible by transferring 
resources from the donor-aid sectors to non-donor aided sectors. Also, World Bank (1998) report on assessing 
aid supported the fact that countries with good monetary, fiscal and trade policies (i.e. good policy environment) 
registered high positive effect of aid. Such good policy environment depends on the donor or recipient country; 
of great importance is whether recipient countries spend donor funds on intended purposes. However, studies 
using time series data in individual countries (Levy, 1987; McGuire, 1987; Gang and Khan, 1990; Pack and Pack, 
1990) found no significant diversion and all agree that countries spend foreign aid funds on the designated 
purposes.  
At sectoral level, Feyzioglu, Swaroop and Zhu (1998) found that aid is fungible on earmarked 
concessional loans for agriculture, education and energy, but not for transport and communication sectors. Pack 
and Pack (1990, 1993) concur with Feyzioglu, et al., (in the case of Indonesia and Sri Lanka) that strong fly 
paper effect does occur on concessional loans (but the results differ with data on the Dominican Republic). The 
evidence that aid money increases government expenditure means that the recipient governments do use the 
increased resources to increase spending, cut taxes or reduce fiscal deficits.  
Further on the effect of foreign aid on government expenditure, Devarajan and Swaroop (1998) found 
that most aid (about 90 percent) boosted government expenditure with no significant evidence of tax relief.  
About half the aid was used to finance external debt service payments; one quarter to finance investments and 
the other quarter to offset current account deficits. On the other hand, Swaroop, Jha and Rajkumar (2000) 
focusing on the effects of foreign aid on expenditure decisions of central government of India, found that foreign 
aid merely substitute for already earmarked government spending. The central government spends funds 
obtained through aid on non-development activities; this implies that government choices are unaffected by 
external sources of finance. Finally, a comprehensive survey of theoretical and empirical literature using both 
panel and time series data supports the notion that aid increases government expenditure (Hudson 2004; 
McGillivray, et al., 2006).  
On the other hand, a study conducted by McGillivray et al., (2006) demonstrates how aid to African 
countries not only increases growth but also reduces poverty. Furthermore, he points out the important fact that 
continuously growing poverty, mainly in sub-Saharan African countries, compromises the MDGs (Millennium 
Development Goals) main target of dropping the percentage of people living in extreme poverty to half the 1990 
level by 2015. His research empirically analyzes time series data for 1968-1999. The paper concludes that the 
policy regimes of each country, such as inflation and trade openness, influence the amounts of aid received.  
Ouattara (2006) analyzed the effect of aid flows on key fiscal aggregates in Senegal. The paper utilized 
data over the time period 1970 – 2000 and focused on the relationship between aid and debt. Three conclusions 
were made from the study. First, that a large portion of aid flows, approximately 41 percent, goes into financing 
Senegal’s debt and 20 percent of the government’s resources are used for debt servicing. Second, the impact of 
aid flows on domestic expenditures is statistically insignificant, and lastly, that debt servicing has a significant 
International Journal of African and Asian Studies                                                                                                                           www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2409-6938     An International Peer-reviewed Journal 
Vol.23, 2016 
 
132 
negative effect on domestic expenditure. Thus, his paper concluded that debt reduction could become a more 
successful policy tool than obtaining additional loans. Addison, Mavrotas and McGillivray (2005) examined 
trends in official aid to Africa over the period 1960 to 2002. The study found a relatively decreasing aid flow to 
Africa over the last decade which will likely affect Africans living in poverty and the African economy as a 
whole. As a result of the shortfall in aid, the MDGs will be much harder if not impossible to be achieved. Thus, 
the paper concluded that aid do promote growth and reduce poverty. In addition, it also positively impacts public 
sector aggregates as it contributes to increase public spending and lowers domestic borrowing. However, the 
MGDs cannot be achieved with development aid alone there is need to explore other innovative sources of 
development finance.  
An empirical study by Karras (2006) examines the correlation between foreign aid and growth in per 
capita GDP using annual data from 1960 to 1997 for a sample of 71 aid-receiving developing countries and the 
paper concluded that the effect of foreign aid on economic growth is positive, permanent, and statistically 
significant. Though, the study neglected the effect of policies but found an increase in foreign aid by $20 per 
person leads to an increase in the growth rate of real GDP per capita by 0.16 percent.  
Gomanee, Girma, and Morrissay (2005) addressed directly the mechanisms through which aid 
influenced growth. A sample of 25 Sub-Saharan African countries was examined over the period 1970 to 1997 
and the study concluded that foreign aid had a significant positive effect on economic growth. Furthermore, they 
identified investment as the most significant transmission instrument. The paper also concluded that Africa’s 
poor growth profile should be attributed to factors other than aid ineffectiveness. Rather than using a large pool 
of data for numerous developing countries, Quartey’s (2005) paper focused on innovative ways of making 
financial aid effective in Ghana and noted that the government and its partners need to plan better and coordinate 
their efforts to make ‘multi-donor budgetary support’ (MDBS) successful. Quartey (2005) also suggested that 
government needs to work towards reducing its debt burden in order to reduce dependency on aid inflows as a 
means of servicing debt.  
Economic research on foreign aid effectiveness and growth has frequently attracted unending interest in 
literature. Burnside and Dollar (2000) searched the links between aid, policy, and growth and found that foreign 
aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies but has 
little effect in the presence of poor policies. This result has enormous policy implications and as such it provides 
a role and strategy for foreign aid. Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) reassesses whether foreign aid 
influences growth in the presence of good policies using more data and concluded that adding new data raises 
reservation on the effectiveness of aid. According to Easterly (2003), achieving a beneficial aggregate impact of 
foreign aid remains a mystery.  
According to Abuzeid (2009), sound policy and good economic management is more important than 
foreign aid for developing countries. Bauer (1993) claimed that the problem is that aid goes to governments 
whose policies retard growth and create poverty and these countries have incentives to make sure their 
institutions remain of poor quality because this will lead to more economic crises and an increase in aid flows 
(Azam and Laffont 2003).  
The improvement of institutions is very important to decreasing inequality because better, more 
democratic institutions helps government to meet the needs of the poor (Reuveny and Lee 2003). Better 
institutions and governance also decreases inequality by redistributing income through effective taxation and by 
decreasing the influence of the “high-income political elites” through crackdowns on corruption. As the record 
shows, without good institutions, aid is likely to have a detrimental impact on the quality of governance in a 
recipient developing country. In the absence of these strong institutions, assistance efforts should be dedicated to 
improving the quality of governance before they can be effectively devoted to any economic development effort.  
Ram (2004) looks at the issue of poverty and economic growth from the view of recipient country’s 
policies being the important element in the effectiveness of foreign aid. Nevertheless, he disagrees with the 
accepted view that redirecting aid toward countries with better policies leads to higher economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Based on his research the author concluded that evidence is lacking to support the leading 
belief that directing foreign assistance to countries with good ‘policy’ will increase the impact on growth or 
poverty reduction in developing countries. Contrarily, Rodrik (1998) argued that countries with weak institutions 
are unable to deal with major economic shocks and this reflected in the slow performance of less developed 
countries. Also, Osabuohien and Ike (2011) concluded that economies with weak institutions move at a slow 
economic transformation rate because they would have difficulties in dealing with political and economic shock 
experiences.  
Ram (2004) looks at the issue of poverty and economic growth from the view of recipient country’s 
policies being the important element in the effectiveness of foreign aid. Nevertheless, he disagrees with the 
accepted view that redirecting aid toward countries with better policies leads to higher economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Based on his research the author concluded that evidence is lacking to support the leading 
belief that directing foreign assistance to countries with good ‘policy’ will increase the impact on growth or 
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poverty reduction in developing countries. Contrarily, Rodrik (1998) argued that countries with weak institutions 
are unable to deal with major economic shocks and this reflected in the slow performance of less developed 
countries. Also, Osabuohien and Ike (2011) concluded that economies with weak institutions move at a slow 
economic transformation rate because they would have difficulties in dealing with political and economic shock 
experiences.  
 
3. Sources of Failure of Aid: Internal versus External  
Apart from those who, based on empirical studies, have made definite arguments about the effectiveness of aid, 
there remains a contention between those who believe aid failure is a result of factors within the recipient 
country and those who argue it is attributable to external impediments such as the unfair global economic 
structure. Akonor (2008) argues “aid to Africa is a “Band-Aid”, not a long-term solution” since aid does not aim 
at transforming Africa’s structurally dependent economies. He adds that if donors aim to make long-term 
sustainable impact, aid should target transcontinental projects such as highways, telecommunications and power 
plants.  
There are others who still play solely the dependency card. In the past and even now, theorists such as 
Amin (1972), Peter Bauer and Andre Gunder Frank (1966). have blamed the global economic structure for the 
underdevelopment of the Third World. Frank concludes in an article in 1966 that underdevelopment is 
“generated by... the development of capitalism” and that the more a country is close to the centre, the more 
marginalized it is. Bauer (2000) argues development aid “promotes dependence on others” as it creates the 
impression that “emergence from poverty depends on external donations rather than on people’s own efforts, 
motivation, arrangements and institutions.” Prah (2002) admits Africa should take responsibility for its failings 
due to bad practices and dictatorships though he thinks the problem is caused by a mix of internal and external 
factors. This point is not recognized by Calderisi (2006) who argues that the African problem is inbred and thus 
cannot be blamed on globalization, unequal international, trade, colonialism, debt or slavery. The crux of the 
problem, according to him, resides in culture, corruption and the political correctness of donors who fail to tell 
African leaders where they are going wrong. He suggests new aid should be tough and focused on five ‘serious’ 
countries, namely, Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Mali. The ‘seriousness’ of these countries, 
according to Calderisi, is a result of their governments’ efforts towards ‘good governance’ and fighting endemic 
corruption. We under- stand and actually accept that the unfair nature of the global economic structure affects 
development in the Third World and reduces the positive impact of foreign aid there. However, for the purpose 
of this paper, we shall not focus too much on this argument since we believe blaming external forces alone for 
Africa’s woes simplifies the problem, and make the reasons why many states are failing to make progress 
myopic.  
 
3.1 The problem of aid dependence  
It appears as though most African countries are so dependent on aid that without it almost half of their yearly 
budgetary commitments cannot be fulfilled. For example, in 1992, aid is said to have accounted for 12.4 per cent 
of gross national product (GNP), over 70 per cent of gross domestic savings and investments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and over 50 per cent of all imports (Ampaw, 2000). Under the age-old saying that “you cannot bite the 
fingers that feed you,” leaders of these countries are unable to speak out when fake and unwanted goods flood 
their markets. It seems aid is not meant to ensure recipients become self-reliant since if it is the case, powerful 
states can no longer brag about who is giving more than the other. The conclusion we can deduce here is that 
since aid is not a “joystick by which donors can manipulate macroeconomic or political outcomes” (Edgren, 
2002).  
To a large extent, Africa’s development depends on “African private sector entrepreneurs, African civic 
activists and African political reformers... not on what ineffective, bureaucratic, unaccountable and poorly 
informed and motivated outsiders do” (Easterly, 2005). Besides, there is constant debt servicing where recipients 
routinely report to donors, service donor consultants and try to keep things “normal” (Kanbur, 2000), thus 
neglecting domestic issues and development. Loans put Africa in debt and it has to spend eternity in a merry-go-
round affair to reschedule and negotiate “to keep gross inflows sufficient to fund debt servicing outflows” 
(Kanbur, 2000). Karikari (2002) argues that development assistance has resulted in dependency as “it induces a 
lazy, slavish, dependent mentality and culture across society – from governments to villagers.” This, according 
to him, under- mines the peoples’ faith in themselves and the fact that they can make it on their own. Other 
scholars also think development should be situated within the context of the country concerned. Prah (2002) for 
instance argues that “people can best develop from the foundations of their indigenous knowledge” which is 
embedded in the culture of the people, adding that imposing a notion of “modernity” on Africa will not yield 
desired results. This does not ignore what the people already know but rather integrates the new knowledge into 
it. He finds that it will be difficult for the African elites who are “surrogates for Western culture in Africa” to 
fashion indigenously oriented development plans.  
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Ampaw (2002) believes the modernization paradigm is “a historical construct, not fashioned by a 
critical analysis of Africa’s present condition as a product of history, structural presuppositions and process.” 
Ampaw says even a national economic policy choice that is driven by the logic of structural adjustment program 
and its neo- liberal underpinnings will not make Africa experience autonomous development. And he doubts if 
this paradigm that propagates the role of foreign capital investment as catalyst to growth is really beneficial since 
the long- term dependence on aid puts the continent in a vulnerable position. Despite commitments by OECD 
countries to increase aid, Ampaw argues the trend of Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been falling 
since the beginning of the 1980s. He mentions that this fall has been confounded by the rise in ODA for “global 
housekeeping activities” such as managing the environment, controlling illicit drugs, and preventing infectious 
diseases such AIDS. Ampaw notes that these activities in the last few years have risen to about 40 per cent of 
ODA. This suggests that monies that previously targeted poverty reduction in Africa are now being channeled to 
deal with these global issues. Yet donors still want everyone to believe aid is flowing at an increased rate. Moyo 
(2009) argues that the notion that aid can alleviate poverty is a myth since “aid has been and continues to be, an 
unmitigated political, economic and humanitarian disaster” for most developing countries. She sees the vicious 
cycle of aid as one that chokes off investment, encourages dependency and facilitates corruption, adding that this 
cycle “perpetuates underdevelopment and guarantees economic failure” in poor regions. In her book, Moyo also 
touches on ‘the paradox of plenty’, insisting that aid instigates conflicts in Africa. If not, how come the same 
continent that receives the largest amount of aid is the most conflict ridden place in the world? For instance, the 
estimated costs of armed conflicts in Africa between 1990 and 2005 exceeded US$300 billion – an amount 
which is almost equal to overseas development assistance in the same period (UNDP, 2007).  
This means that in places like Sudan, Congo, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi and Somalia, armed conflicts 
hinder efforts towards development – and that even when the floodgates of foreign aid are continually open, it 
will have no long-term effects. In this sense, countries that have depended on foreign aid are now facing the 
adverse consequences of their actions. Moyo therefore, suggests a low-aid market-based development financing 
model that encourages trade and investment (from both foreign and domestic middle class). This is her formula: 
5 per cent from aid, 30 per cent from trade, 30 per cent from FDI, 10 per cent from capital markets and the 
remaining 25 per cent from remittances and harnessed domestic savings.  
Her point that aid is not working is cogent, no two ways about it. However, her thesis makes it seem aid 
is entirely redundant as it stalls progress. Meanwhile, the trade and FDI which she advocates have not been 
entirely beneficial to poor countries. Berry (2000) thinks an open market is not necessarily an answer to world 
poverty since some of the things society would have naturally opted for such as “strong social security network, 
high social expenditures, high minimum wages and job security” are “sacrificed in order to attain the needed 
level of competition” in the ‘dog-eat-dog’ nature of international trade. Culpeper (2004) clearly states that 
foreign direct investment has “little impact on poverty reduction and other fundamental objectives of 
development, or worse, it undermines those objectives.”  
Although we might say the complexity of the African problem requires the tactics of the Machiavellian 
Prince, we cannot decidedly side with Moyo’s lukewarm attitude towards the role of democracy in development. 
To her, what low economies need is not multi-party democracy but a “benevolent dictator.” We cannot definitely 
correlate democracy with progress in Africa; neither can we tell where these countries would have been without 
elements of democracy. They probably could have been worse off. China, for instance, is touted as the third 
leading world economy, yet with burgeoning records of inequality and gross human rights violations. It is a 
paradox of modernity with Chinese characteristics, maybe, but what is development without equity and freedom 
from suppression? One needs to be skeptical of a so-called ‘benevolent dictator’ because he is likely not the one 
to save the bottom billion (Collier, 2007) from the bottomless pit of poverty, disease, corruption, weak 
institutions and overall underdevelopment – even global marginalization. The issue is not just whether aid 
increases dependency, or that a dictator can do the job. What is required is a separation of the ‘merely desirable’ 
from the ‘essentials’ of democracy and also a way of making aid influence, not determine, the development of 
poor countries.  
 
3.2. Correlation between Foreign Aid and Economic Development  
Is there any evidence that aid facilitate growth? Even if it does, is it growth measured by GDP or one that is 
measured by levels of poverty and basic living standards? There is no agreement in the literature on this question. 
While Rostow (1990) sees foreign assistance – the “external intrusion by more advanced societies” – as a 
precondition for the take-off into economic success, Hayter (1971) argues it is a disguised form of imperialism 
and as such cannot result in any desired economic benefits. To her any benefit that could arise from aid would 
only be incidental, not planned. These two divergent schools of thought in the aid/development literature are still 
present to date.  
A paper by Burnside and Dollar (1997) was emphatic that there is a correlation between aid and 
economic growth, but only when aid is applied in a good policy environment. The paper, using a sample of 56 
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countries and six four-year time periods from 1970 - 1973 until 1990 - 1993, shows that where aid coincided 
with good policies, its impact on growth was strong and positive.  
Collier and Dollar (2001) also argue “aid is conditionally effective,” with conditions including policy 
environment, governance, rates of corruption and conflicts. Despite the support the Burnside and Dollar stance 
has amassed (Dovern and Nunnemkamp, 2007; John and Sackey, 2008), there are other studies that show no 
significant correlation between aid and growth. In the first place, besides the point that the four-year ranges they 
used is too short to measure significant growth, if the focus is “good policies” then very poor countries will not 
be selected for aid since they will mostly not meet this criterion.  
Thus, eradicating poverty will not be realized soon. On this same matter, Easterly et al. (2003) found 
different results when they added more data and also extended the year range from 1993 to 1997. Although they 
do not actually argue that aid is ineffective, they find that with the introduction of the new data, the positive 
relationship between aid and growth withers away.  
Easterly (2003) has pursued this argument further, stating that “the idea that ‘aid buys growth’ is an 
integral part of the founding myth and ongoing mission of the aid bureaucracy.” Another argument is that aid 
reduces the incentives to invest, especially when the recipient is assured that future poverty will call for more aid. 
This phenomenon is known as the Samaritan’s Dilemma (Gibson et al., 2005; The Economist, 1995). Aid can 
also reduce the recipient country’s competitiveness (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005), culminating in the Dutch 
disease (a condition that reduces competiveness of the manufacturing sector due to overabundance of foreign 
assistance). The robustness of the many empirical studies have been tested but the fact remains that most 
scholars agree aid in real terms has not been effective as it has a “weak association with poverty, democracy and 
good policy” (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  
While Sachs (2005) sees more aid as increasing the possibility “to end extreme poverty by 2025”, some 
recent literature ask a more reflective question: does foreign aid really work? (Riddell, 2007). Riddell presents a 
more balanced analysis of why aid has not lived up to performance by discussing the systemic impediments at 
the donor level (such as distortions caused by mixed interests, voluntarism in aid-giving and multiplicity of 
donors) and the issues of commitment, capacity, owner- ship and governance at the recipient end. He outlines a 
cluster of motives that have historically influenced aid allocation. They are (1) to address emergency needs; (2) 
for development – growth and poverty reduction goals; (3) to show solidarity; (4) to promote donor’s 
commercial, political and strategic interests; (5) historical ties; (6) to reduce the ill effects of globalization; and 
(7) aid giving dependent on recipient’s human rights record. Riddell concludes that although aid has made a 
difference, it could make a greater difference by having a “long-term, systemic or sustainable impact” on the 
lives of the poor when the roadblocks are removed.  
This suggests that aid is not necessarily ‘a good thing’ but that it can be beneficial. If it is entirely a 
good thing, how come many countries in Africa still struggle with poverty? How come the same continent that is 
touted to receive the biggest chunk of aid money had an average growth rate of 3.8% between 1996 and 2000 
and 4.75 in 2005? (OECD Observer, 2005). Finding a correlation between aid and (under) development remains 
a complex task but with the limited evidence of aid having had a good impact on Africa’s development, we 
believe there is more to the debate than most scholars have recognized. To better explain Africa’s developmental 
complexities, we think culture cannot be ignored.  
 
4. Foreign Aid and Its Effects on a Country Economy 
4.1. Foreign Aid Destroys Local Industries 
Foreign aid in the form of supplies severely harms local industries in recipient countries. In an environment 
where free food, medicine, stationary, tents are readily available domestic producer of these goods do not get 
value for their produce; sometime, good intention might be harming the local economy. In one case mentioned 
by Dambisa Moyo in her book Dead Aid, a philanthropic Hollywood star spent several million dollars on about 
100 thousand tents, and sent them to Africa to help prevent the spread of malaria.1 Immediately local people 
benefit from this kind act and fewer people are affected with malaria. In a short time, few people would need to 
buy tents from local suppliers. Thus, it would strike suppliers, along with the workers they hire, and the suppliers 
on the upstream of the whole industry chain. They will lose their income to a great degree due to the sharp 
decrease of demand. A more devastating result is that they would be bankrupt and push out of the industry by the 
free imported tents. 
As Amartya Sen has shown, food aid has the effect of destroying local agriculture, and benefits western 
agribusiness mostly, which are overproducing food and need to open new markets overseas2. Imagine the 
immensity of the following contradiction: a country like the Democratic Republic of Congo can produce food for 
an estimated 3 billion people, but today it is a net importer of food, and a large part of its 60 million inhabitants 
                                                          
1 Dambisa Moyo, “Dead Aid”, 1st Edition, p31 
2 “Africa Rising”, The Economist, 3 December, 2011 
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receive food aid distributed by an army of NGOs from the West. The example can be replicated across Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
For that reason, leading humanitarian aid organisation Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 
Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) now says part of this obscenity is the result of the way the food aid industry currently 
works. Food aid has become an end in itself and constitutes a form of dumping that can be extremely destructive 
to local agricultural markets. The food aid 'industry' has become one of the dreadful 'dependency factors' that 
keep Africa in eternal poverty and dictate its development (these factors include the continuing effects of 
colonialism, resource wars induced by the West, the presence of post-colonial political satraps, hegemonic 
NGOs, foreign aid, Worldbankism, and indeed, food aid). 
Especially the food aid system employed by the United States is seen as counter-productive: the U.S. 
government buys cheap food from powerful American agribusiness, hands it out to American charities in Africa, 
who then get to sell it for a profit. With the profit the NGOs fund themselves. This system has become big 
business and ruins the chances of local farmers to compete. Some go so far as to say food aid feeds everyone, 
except the poor. To make its point, Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) has decided 
to refuse about US$45 million a year in federal funding from the U.S., saying the system hurts the very poor 
people it aims to help. "If someone wants to help you, they should not do it by destroying the very thing that they 
are trying to promote;” one example of this practice is the sale of American wheat and vegetable oil that is 
flooding Kenya. 
Furthermore, Zambia is an African country that produces abundant cotton. Textile industry is one of the 
most important industries in Zambia. Since their opening up in 1980s, countless pieces of second-hand clothes 
come to this country, through foreign aid or import. Their local produced cotton and textile do not have any 
advantage compared to second-hand clothes from other countries. In the past, Zambian people wore cotton 
clothes produced in their own countries, with cotton grown in the very country. Now, it is difficult to find clothes 
or textile produced by their local cotton and textile industries. In 1980s, about 25 000 people were employed to 
work in their textile industry, but that number decreased to 10,000 in 2002 and half of the workers had to look 
for jobs in other industries, or just stay at home1. 
 
4.2. Financial Aid Causes Inflation in Recipient Countries 
Inflation is one common problem in any economy. It happens in all countries, and it hurts their economic growth. 
According to a report of IMF, the mean inflation rate in SSA from 2005-2013 was 10.1 percent, while the mean 
index of all the developing countries in the world was 8.7 per cent2. The majority of countries that have the 
highest CPI in the world are SSA countries, Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana and Malawi had average CPI from 2011-
2015 above 10 per cent, which is rarely seen in other parts of the world3. These are also countries that receive 
plenty of foreign aid.  
In Somalia, especially in the capital of Mogadishu, the influx of cash from well-meaning foreign aid has 
negatively affected low-income families. Prices of food had increased since the foreign aid agencies came to 
Somalia. As a result, poor people could not afford to manage their living standard because of the rise in price of 
commodities. In 2011, according to an interviewed from parent who lived in Mogadishu, household expenditure 
increased due to inflation4. Some people argue that financial aid usually does not cause inflation because it is 
different from issuing too much money with in one country. Nevertheless, inflation appears when the growth of 
amount of money in the market greatly excels the growth of production of actual products. In many Sub-Saharan 
African countries that receive large quantities of financial aid, if the money luckily really goes down to people, 
they will be able to buy more things and improve their living standard; if the money is largely taken by corrupted 
government officials, then the outcome of aid will not be realized.  
It seems that in this way, financial aid will increase the demand of goods and help promote the 
development of local economy. In fact, things are more complicated than this. Countries that receive significant 
financial aid usually are least developed in economy. There are not many factories, not much supply is offered 
by local producers. People used the money they get from aid to buy things, whereas there are not enough goods 
in the market to meet their demand. One immediate result is that the prices of produce will increase. Then, 
gradually, the producers will try to make more food, clothes, cars and other things to meet the increased demand. 
It seems good, but inflation has already struck their economy, and more money has flowed in through financial 
                                                          
1 Yan Lei, “The Effect of the Reform of Trade Liberalization on Textile Industry in Zambia”, Journal of Shanxi University, 
May 2010, Vol. 33, No. 3 
2 Anh D.M. Nguyen, Jemma Dridi, Filiz D. Unsal and Oral H. Williams, “IMF Working Paper: On the Drivers of Inflation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa”, August 2015, p4 
3 Inflation, Consumer Prices (%), World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG/countries?display=default 
4 Mohamed Abdi Moddaale, “The Impact of Foreign Aid: Inflation”, Somalia Report, 10/06/2011: 
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1713/The_Impact_of_Foreign_Aid_Inflation 
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aid. Thus financial aid has created a vicious circle: it causes inflation, then economy is negatively affected, so 
more aid comes, and inflation becomes even more severe, economy becomes worse. 
 
4.3. Aid Contributes to Corruption 
The need for aid-recipient countries to have good policies and good-quality institutions in order to ensure a good 
management and a good effectiveness of aid has been a matter of interest of aid politics and academicians. More 
interestingly, the potential effect that aid could have on the quality of these institutions has also attracted the 
interest of many scholars. Even though the debate is still controversial, many empirical studies have concluded 
that aid dependence can potentially undermine institutional quality, by weakening accountability, encouraging 
rent-seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, siphoning off scarce talent from the 
bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions. These empirical studies 
have focused on indexes of institutional quality (democracy, governance, corruption economic liberties indexes, 
etc.) (Svensson, 2000; Gold- smith, 2001; Knack, 2001; Alesina and Weder, 2002; McNab and Everhart, 2002; 
Hoffman, 2003; Tavares, 2003; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 2004; FMI, 2005; Coviello and Is- lam, 
2006; Dalgaard and Olsson, 2006).  
Focusing on the specific impact of aid on corruption, some empirical studies fuel the controversy. In 
particular, a couple of them have demonstrated that aid leads to more corruption in recipient countries. Why? 
The negative impact of aid on the quality of recipient countries’ institutions is traditionally paralleled 
with the so-called "natural resources curse phenomenon" in the literature. This phenomenon explains that 
countries with great natural resource wealth would tend to experience more slow growth rates than resource-poor 
countries. Investigating the explanations of that, a huge literature has provided a political economy theoretical 
framework to explain the resources curse, pointing out induced-rent-seeking behaviors are the cause1 Sala-i Mar- 
tin and Subramanian (2003) show that natural resources appear to cause no direct effect on growth; the negative 
effects, while severe, are indirect and operate through the weakness of institutions. Lane and Tornell (1996) and 
Tornell and Lane (1999) point out dysfunctional institutions inviting grabbing as the source of the disappointing 
growth performance after the oil windfalls in Nigeria, Venezuela, and Mexico. They explain how the "voracity 
effect" (the more-than-proportional increase in redistribution in response to a windfall) leads to lower growth.  
Ades and Di Tella (1999) empirically show that natural resource rents stimulate corruption among 
bureaucrats and politicians. Other things equal, countries where firms en- joy higher rents (and thus where 
bureaucrats and politicians can extract them) tend to have higher corruption levels. According to Torvik (2002), 
a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of rent-seekers (entrepreneurs engaged in rent 
seeking) and reduces the number of modern entrepreneurs (running productive firms). Entrepreneurs move into 
rent- seeking once profit in rent-seeking is higher than before the windfall while profit in modern production is 
the same as before. Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) provides cases studies explaining how higher 
resource rents make it easier for dictators to buy off political challengers. In the Congo the "enormous natural 
resource wealth including 15% of the world’s copper deposits, vast amounts of diamonds, zinc, gold, silver, oil, 
and many other resources [. . .] gave Mobutu a constant flow of income to help sustain his power". (p. 171). 
Their work explain that resource abundance increases the political benefits of buying votes through inefficient 
redistribution. The work of Leite and Weidmann (1999) also suggests that resource (especially minerals) rich 
countries tend to be more prone to rent-seeking and corruption, thereby decreasing the quality of government. 
Natural resources would create opportunities for rent-seeking behavior.  
Several studies have provided empirical as well as theoretical evidence that foreign aid is associated 
with more rent-seeking activities and corruption2 Boone (1996) analyzing the importance of the political regime 
for the effectiveness of aid programs, finds, with a panel of developing countries that foreign aid fails to raise the 
investment rate in recipient countries, because aid resources are mostly consumed. Knack (2001) provides 
evidence that higher levels of aid increase the level of corruption and thus erodes the quality of governance. By 
benign a potential source of rents. He provides the example of Tanzania where the increase of aid levels in the 
1970s and 80s helped enlarge a public sector creating more opportunities for corruption by sustaining large 
government subsidies to state-owned enterprises and parastatals. Using data from the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) including two six-point scale measures of corruption in government and rule-of-law (reflecting 
the potential for rent- seeking associated with weak legal systems and insecure property rights), aid levels have 
proved to be strongly and negatively related to changes in corruption ad rule-of-law measures.  
 
                                                          
1 The "resource curse"-literature provides another kind of answers through the "Dutch-disease" phenomenon, well developed 
in Sachs and Warner (2001, 1997); natural resources abundance shifts factors of production out of sectors where production 
exhibits static or dynamic increasing returns to scale, pushing down productivity growth  
2 Although a couple of studies have reached the opposite conclusion, based on empirical results, that is more aid leads to less 
corruption (McNab and Everhart, 2002; Dalgaard and Olsson, 2008; Tavares, 2003)  
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5. Conclusion  
It is difficult to conclude from the many debates above especially since there is no single magic wand (or stick) 
to command development to appear. Most of the so- called empirical studies focus on economic growth in the 
macro-economic sense without taking cognizance that development is much bigger than just statistically 
significant improvement in GDP per capita. The reality is that there could still be widespread poverty in the 
grassroots even when a country is perceived to have attained appreciable levels of macro-economic growth. 
Given the unclear and ambiguous nature of empirical literature on aid effectiveness, we cannot have a firm 
conclusion that aid has led to (under) development in Africa. However, we reiterate our argument that unless 
aid/development discussions incorporate socio-cultural factors, we cannot fully appreciate why foreign aid has 
failed to deliver ‘development’ in Africa. We propose a return to the culture-development discussions which 
have been over- shadowed by macro-economic ‘buzzwords’ in the development literature. This is against the 
backdrop that inasmuch as GDP growth rates matter, policies and institutions work in some socio-cultural milieu 
which has mostly been ignored by donors: The focus is too often on money alone, to the detriment of aid 
performance.  
 
5.1 Policy recommendations 
1. More assistance targeted to private sectors in developing countries, because business should be the 
engine of growth in the developing world;  
2. A new business model to engage new non-governmental partners — foreign aid should be conducted in 
concert with local private or public partners that are committed to development;  
3. Strengthened management capacity of foreign assistance agencies. International donors should improve 
monitoring and evaluation, human resources, and procurement and contracting capabilities of agencies 
involved with foreign aid to improve the effectiveness of taxpayer dollars. Also, while the workload of 
foreign aid agencies has gone up, the staff has been cut, which hurts effectiveness of the programs;  
4. Promotion of local self-sufficiency by providing needs-based aid and building local capacity;  
5. Adopt a unified, results-based management approach, based on principles of the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness for improved aid effectiveness.  
6. Increase non-project aid to developing country governments that have credible and transparent and 
coherent development strategies;  
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